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• The Bank of Canada has a keen interest in
understanding the impact of changes to its
key policy rate on the prices of ﬁnancial
assets.
• The impact of policy surprises on asset prices
can be used to infer ﬁnancial markets’
interpretation of policy decisions.
• A signiﬁcant movement in yields at the short
end suggests that markets are responding to
the timing of policy actions, while the absence
of a marked change at the long end suggests
that markets do not detect a shift in the policy
objectives of the Bank.
• Measuring the response of asset prices to
policy surprises in the periods before and after
the introduction of a ﬁxed schedule for
announcing interest rate decisions provides
some evidence that using ﬁxed announcement
dates has  enhanced the credibility of the
Bank.
* Thanks to Éric Chouinard, Christine Fay, Scott Hendry, Grahame Johnson,
Marianne Johnson, Chris Ragan, and Eric Santor, for comments, and to
Soﬁa Assaf and François Bélanger for research assistance.  This short version
of a longer paper on the same topic was presented to the Bank’s Governing
Council on 12 November 2004.
nderstanding how its policy actions1 affect
the prices of ﬁnancial assets is a subject of
ongoing importance to the Bank of Canada.
In this article, the ﬁrst to measure the impact
of policy surprises on fixed-income markets from a
Canadian perspective, three questions are explored:
What is the impact of policy actions on bond and bill
yields; what is the impact on bond and bill yields
when policy actions are decomposed into expected
and surprise components; and what, if any, effect did
the introduction of ﬁxed announcement dates (FADs)2
have on these responses. Specifically, we asked whether
the greater transparency flowing from the Bank’s
introduction of the FADs increased the ability of market
participants to anticipate changes to the policy rate. To
assess the impact of the Bank’s shift to the FAD regime,
the sample used in this study is split into the pre-FAD
and post-FAD periods. To provide an additional per-
spective, the results are compared with work done in
the United States.
Previous Studies
This article examines the impact of monetary policy
surprises on ﬁxed-income markets in Canada before
and after the introduction of the FADs. In their study
1.   Policy actions are decisions by the Bank that affect its key policy rate, the
target for the overnight rate, which is the midpoint of the Bank’s operating
band for overnight ﬁnancing.
2.    In December 2000, the Bank of Canada implemented a new procedure in
which policy actions would typically be considered only on eight pre-
announced dates each year. To date, only one change has been made between
FADs: on 17 September 2001, the Bank lowered the target for the overnight
rate by 50 basis points (bps) following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.
That policy action was not included in this study.
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of the reaction of U.S. markets to monetary policy
actions, Cook and Hahn (1989) ﬁnd a response that is
positive and signiﬁcant at all maturities, but smaller at
the long end of the yield curve. Kuttner (2000) revisits
the Cook and Hahn methodology and records responses
that are smaller and less notable across the entire curve.
Kuttner then decomposes policy-rate changes into
surprise and expected components and ﬁnds that the
response from surprises is significant and uniformly
prevalent across the yield curve. This work will be
compared with the results presented below.
Specifically, we asked whether the
increased transparency flowing from the
Bank’sintroduction of the FADs increased
the ability of market participants to
anticipate changes to the policy rate.
Kohn and Sack (2003) examine whether certain central
bank communications have an impact on financial
variables. Beyond the empirical work, which demon-
strates that statements from members of the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC), as well as congres-
sional testimony, have an impact on short- and medium-
term interest rates, they offer a framework for analyz-
ing these effects that differentiates between surprises
resulting from the timing of policy changes and more
fundamental surprises concerning the direction of
monetary policy, with specific reference to the goals
and credibility of the central bank. Movements in
shorter-term interest rates are generally classiﬁed as
responses to the timing (i.e., as happening this month
vs. next month) of policy changes (independent of the
near-term economic outlook).3 Movements in longer-
term rates are classified as responses to the longer-term
economic outlook of monetary policy and reflect
expectations about changes to the direction of policy
or, more fundamentally, changes to the goals or credi-
bility of the central bank. Although Kohn and Sack’s
study includes policy actions, testimony, and speeches,
in this article their framework will be used to better
understand only the information content of policy
actions.
3. Kohn and Sack refer to these changes as policy-inclination changes, but in
this article we will describe them as policy-timing changes.
Methodology
Work in the United States (Kuttner 2000; Bernanke
and Kuttner 2003) typically uses movements in the
federal funds futures contract to measure market
expectations of future changes in the federal funds
rate. This instrument is generally preferred because it
is valued at the expected average federal funds rate
over the holding period.4 Since a similar market-based
proxy of interest rate expectations is not available for
Canadian markets, 5 the 1-month banker’s acceptance
(BA) rate is used in our study. The 1-month BA is a
tradable corporate obligation that is backed by a line
of credit and is guaranteed by the accepting banks.
Johnson (2003) ﬁnds that it is the 1-month instrument
that best correlates with movements in the overnight
rate;6 as Chart 1 shows, the yield on the 1-month BA
closely tracks the overnight rate.
4.   Rigobon and Sack (2002) and Poole and Rasche (2003), among others, use
eurodollar futures as market-based measures of expectations of changes to
the policy rate.
5.   The overnight repo rate futures contract (ONX) is modelled after the U.S.
federal funds futures contract. Pricing of this instrument is based on the
expected average overnight rate during the contract period as measured by
CORRA (the Canadian overnight repo rate average), which is based on inter-
dealer broker data.  The ONX contract is relatively new, and trading is not as
liquid as it is with other money market instruments.
6. Johnson tested six different money market instruments and found that the
1-month BA is the best instrument for measuring implied expectations. Based
on his model of the expectations hypothesis, a theory of interest rates that
states that a longer-term single-yield interest rate is the geometric average of
expected future short-term rates plus a risk premium (see Johnson 2003),
Johnson found that, in the 1-month sector, BAs had the highest adjusted R2
and the lowest term premium (in absolute values).
Chart 1
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Although the 1-month BA is not directly linked to the
overnight rate in the same way that the federal funds
futures contract is to the federal funds target rate, 1-day
changes to the 1-month BA can be used to decompose
changes in the policy rate into expected and surprise
components. We follow Kuttner’s methodology and
assume that the 1-day change in the 1-month BA rate
that occurs on the day when the policy rate is moved
reﬂects the surprise component of the move. This is
based on the assumption that a portion of the policy
move is anticipated by market participants and is
priced into the BAs before the policy change occurs.
In equation (1), is the actual policy change, and
is the surprise component. The difference between




follow. First, the analysis is limited to the 1-day changes
in asset prices that accompany a policy action, and it is
assumed that market participants are aware of all
policy actions as they occur. During the pre-FAD period,
policy rates could change on any date, and thus there
was no clear means of distinguishing between true
surprises (i.e., actual changes to the policy rate) and
the absence of a policy change on a speciﬁc date.
Therefore, in the pre-FAD period, only actual changes
intheovernightrateareconsideredtobepolicyactions.
In the post-FAD period, every FAD date is considered
a policy action, whether or not the policy rate was
changed.7
During the pre-FAD period, policy
rates could change on any date . . .
and thus there was no clear means of
distinguishingbetweentruesurprises
and the absence of a policy change on
a speciﬁc date.
7.   For example, on 4 September 2002, markets had expected an increase of
21 bps, but the Bank kept the key policy rate constant. This resulted in a sur-









The second consideration is that the simple equation
used to explain the 1-day movement in asset prices
assumes that the policy-rate change was the significant
factor affecting the 1-day movement on that date. That
is, other factors, such as a data release or other market
events, are subsumed into the error term of equation (2)
(below). A possible concern with this approach is that
there may be a shock to the 1-day change in the 1-month
BA rate that is correlated with the change in market
yields—the dependent variable in equation (2). This is
unlikely, given the nature of the BA and the fact that
the policy-rate decision is likely to be the dominant
event on the days examined.8 (FADs are planned so as
not to occur on the same day as the release of major
economic data or other known important events.)
The sample period for the study, August 1996 until
May 2004, includes 49 days when announcements
about the policy rate were made. Throughout this
period, the Bank used the target for the overnight rate
as the monetary policy instrument. The sample is
divided into two subsets: the 21 announcements that
occurred before the FADs were introduced and the
28 announcements made on FADs. The 28 post-FAD
observations include all announcements, whether the
policy rate was changed or not. Table 1 shows the
dates of the policy-rate announcements, along with
the actual policy actions, as well as the expected and
surprise components, as deﬁned by equation (1).
Results
Full sample
The format employed by Kuttner (2000), which applied
the methodology of Cook and Hahn (1989), was used
to estimate the following linear equation in order to
examine the 1-day response of market rates to policy
actions.9 The 1-day change in yields, , was
regressed using ordinary least squares on the change in
the target for the overnight rate, , such that
(2)
where the market rates are 1-day changes in yields of
Government of Canada treasury bills and benchmark
8. One means of reducing the likelihood of this coincidence of events would
be to shorten the event window. Bauer and Vega (2004) use intraday data to
estimate high-frequency monetary policy shocks in the United States and
then show that these shocks have an effect on the cross-section of interna-
tional equity returns.
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bonds. The results reported in Table 2a show the
relationship between changes in the market rates and
policy actions over the sample period. Table 2b shows
the results for the United States, which are taken from
Kuttner (2000).
The coefﬁcients decline in magnitude as the maturity
increases for both countries. This result is consistent
with the expectations hypothesis of interest rates (see
footnote 6), considering that policy-rate changes would
3-month 2.5 36.5 0.50
(1.0) (3.2)
6-month 2.4 29.7 0.46
(1.1) (3.4)
1-year 2.1 26.5 0.42
(1.2) (3.9)
2-year 2.1 21.2 0.33
(1.5) (4.8)
5-year 1.2 10.3 0.13
(0.9) (2.6)
10-year -0.2 5.9 0.09
(-0.2) (2.0)
30-year -0.4 2.4 0.02
(-0.5) (1.1)
Table 2a
The One-Day Response of Yields on Canadian
Bonds and Treasury Bills to Policy Actions*
Maturity Intercept Response R2
3-month -3.0 23.8 0.49
 (2.4) (6.2)
6-month -5.0 18.4 0.29
 (3.5) (4.0)
1-year -5.5 21.6 0.32
 (3.4) (4.3)
2-year -5.2 18.2 0.26
 (3.4) (3.7)
5-year -4.5 10.4 0.10
 (2.9) (2.1)
10-year -4.0 4.3 0.02
 (2.9) (1.0)
30-year -3.6 0.1 0.00
 (3.2) (0.0)
Table 2b
The One-Day Response of Yields on
U.S. Bonds and Treasury Bills to Changes
in the Target for the Federal Funds Rate*
Maturity Intercept Response R2
* Bracketed terms are t-statistics.
Source: Kuttner (2000)
* Bracketed terms are t-statistics.
09 Aug 96 -22 -18 -4
22 Aug 96 -25 -19 -6
02 Oct 96 -25 -10 -15
17 Oct 96 -25 -24 -1
28 Oct 96 -25 -24 -1
08 Nov 96 -25 -24 -1
26 Jun 97 25 7 18
01 Oct 97 25 24 1
25 Nov 97 25 12 13
12 Dec 97 50 21 29
30 Jan 98 50 15 35
27 Aug 98 100 15 85
29 Sep 98 -25 -32 7
16 Oct 98 -25 -30 5
18 Nov 98 -25 -23 -2
31 Mar 99 -25 -7 -18
04 May 99 -25 -6 -19
17 Nov 99 25 19 6
03 Feb 00 25 26 -1
22 Mar 00 25 24 1
17 May 00 50 48 2
05 Dec 00 0 0 0
23 Jan 01 -25 -22 -3
06 Mar 01 -50 -33 -17
17 Apr 01 -25 -28 3
29 May 01 -25 -28 3
17 Jul 01 -25 -23 -2
28 Aug 01 -25 -25 0
23 Oct 01 -75 -49 -26
27 Nov 01 -50 -47 -3
15 Jan 02 -25 -48 23
5 Mar 02 0 0 0
16 Apr 02 25 20 5
04 Jun 02 25 24 1
16 Jul 02 25 25 0
4 Sep 02 0 21 -21
16 Oct 02 0 0 0
3 Dec 02 0 0 0
21 Jan 03 0 1 -1
04 Mar 03 25 20 5
15 Apr 03 25 23 2
3 Jun 03 0 3 -3
15 Jul 03 -25 0 -25
3 Sep 03 -25 -26 1
15 Oct 03 0 -1 1
2 Dec 03 0 -2 2
20 Jan 04 -25 -24 -1
02 Mar 04 -25 -25 0
13 Apr 04 -25 -25 0
Table 1
Actual Policy Actions Decomposed into Expected
and Surprise Components (bps)
Date Actual Expected Surprise15 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2005
be expected to have their strongest impact at the
shortest maturity. The coefﬁcients on the Canadian
results are generally higher than those reported by
Kuttner for U.S. market rates.
In the U.S. study, the shortest maturities present some-
thing of an anomaly: the response of the American
6-month Treasury bill is less than that of the 1-year bill.
In addition, the response of the 3-month Canadian
treasury bill was substantially higher than that of its
U.S. counterpart. A possible explanation may be found
in the institutional structure of the U.S. Treasury bill
market, where many of the large participants in the
market, particularly foreign central banks, use these
short-term bills as cash-management tools, thus ren-
dering them relatively price insensitive.
We can interpret this lack of response
in longer rates as a signal that market
participants are reacting to policy-
timing changes . . . and not to policy-
direction changes.
The results for both countries suggest that, beyond the
5-yearmaturity,theresponseofmarketratestochanges
in the policy rate is not signiﬁcant. Following Kohn
and Sack (2003), we can interpret this lack of response
in longer rates as a signal that market participants are
reacting to policy-timing changes (i.e., information
about the timing of interest rate moves; in the Canadian
case in particular, those seen as necessary to achieve
the inflation target), and not to policy-direction changes
(i.e., information about the economic outlook—specif-
ically the central bank’s long-term policy goals). Pol-
icy-timing changes affect short-term rates, while policy-
direction (or economic-outlook) changes affect longer-
term rates. Nevertheless, it is worth noting the general
direction of monetary policy over the sample period.
For the Canadian study, 25 of the 49 policy actions
were decreases in the policy rate, and in fact, the
overall period can be considered one of policy easing.10
From the beginning to the end of the sample, the policy
rate declined from 4.5 per cent to 2.25 per cent. To the
extent that market participants were aware of the
10.   There were 25 incidents of decreases in the overnight rate, 15 increases,
and 9 dates on which the target did not change.
economic outlook and of the general direction of
monetary policy, one would not expect to see a reaction
at longer maturities. Although the sample used in the
U.S. study contains periods of both easing and tight-
ening of policy rates, the easing is more pronounced,
since 30 of the 42 rate changes were decreases in the
policy rate.
Split sample
Beginning in December 2000, the Bank of Canada
adopted a policy of announcing decisions concerning
the target overnight rate on eight pre-announced dates
each year. One of the purposes of this article is to
examine whether the increased transparency resulting
from the Bank’s introduction of the FADs has increased
the ability of market participants to anticipate changes
to the policy rate. A caveat is that the two samples
(21 and 28 observations, respectively) are small and
suffer from the possible biases associated with small
samples. The results of the split sample are presented
in Tables 3 and 4.
The response of market rates is greater in the pre-FAD
period (Table 3) for all maturities, compared with the
results for the full sample (Table 2a) and those for the
post-FAD period (Table 4). As well, the coefﬁcient on
the response to a policy-rate change is signiﬁcant in
the pre-FAD sample through all maturities except the
30-year bond. For the post-FAD sample, the coefﬁcient
is significant only until the 1-year maturity, after which-
the response is not signiﬁcantly different from zero.11
A possible explanation for this result is that policy-rate
changes have become more widely anticipated in the
post-FAD sample than in the pre-FAD sample, for two
reasons. First, the introduction of the FADs removed
much of the timing uncertainty associated with rate
changes. Second, research at the Bank (Gravelle and
Moessner 2002; Muller and Zelmer 1999) suggests
that, before the FADs, the goals of monetary policy
may not have been clearly understood. For example,
although the Bank has had an inflation target since
1991, there were occasions during the mid-to-late
1990s when the Bank appeared to increase policy rates
to support the currency when the Canadian dollar
was falling relative to the U.S. dollar. Thus, it seems
that, in the pre-FAD period, market participants inter-
preted policy-rate changes as signifying both the policy
11. Despite the apparent differences when the sample is split, a Chow test for
a structural break is not signiﬁcant for any maturity. The result is the same if
we run the full sample regressions with a dummy variable for the post-FAD
period.16 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2005
timing and the policy goals of Canadian monetary
policy (since there was signiﬁcant movement in both
short- and long-term rates).
The results for the post-FAD sample indicate that
monetary policy appears to have been better antici-
pated during this period. The magnitude of the response
is lower than in both the full sample and the pre-FAD
sample, and the coefficient on the response to a change
in the overnight rate is not statistically signiﬁcant at
3-month 2.2 45.9 0.59
(0.63) (3.30)
6-month 2.5 35.6 0.54
(0.78) (3.17)
1-year 2.3 30.9 0.57
(1.02) (4.97)
2-year 2.5 26.0 0.46
(1.05) (4.05)
5-year -0.1 16.1 0.39
(-0.05) (3.46)
10-year -1.5 10.0 0.24
(-1.03) (2.47)
30-year -2.0 5.8 0.12
(-1.56) (1.63)
Table 3
The One-Day Response of Yields on Canadian
Bonds and Treasury Bills to Changes in the Over-
night Rate (pre-FAD sample, 21 observations)*
Maturity Intercept Response R2
3-month 0.5 20.6 0.29
(0.27) (3.25)
6-month 0.8 19.3 0.27
(0.49) (3.07)
1-year 0.8 18.4 0.19
(0.40) (2.48)
2-year 0.5 12.0 0.10
(0.25) (1.73)
5-year 0.9 3.0 0.01
(0.50) (0.42)
10-year 0.2 1.6 0.01
(0.18) (0.41)
30-year 0.5 0.2 0.00
(0.64) (0.06)
Table 4
The One-Day Response of Yields on Canadian
Bonds and Treasury Bills to Policy Actions
(post-FAD sample, 28 observations)*
Maturity Intercept Response R2
* Bracketed terms are t-statistics.
* Bracketed terms are t-statistics.
the 2-year maturity and beyond. These results are
consistent with those from Parent, Munro, and Parker
(2003) with respect to the increasing transparency sur-
rounding the Bank’s policy-rate decisions. Interpret-
ing this within the Kohn and Sack (2003) framework,
this may imply that, post-FAD, ﬁnancial markets now
interpret policy-rate decisions as containing informa-
tion only about the timing of policy actions and not as
signals of changes to policy goals.
These results are also similar to those of Kuttner (2000)
and Roley and Sellon (1995), who observe that, for the
United States, the response of market rates to policy-rate
changes has diminished relative to those observed in
earlier studies. This is consistent with changes made
by the U.S. Federal Reserve to increase the transparency
of their monetary policy actions.12
Expected and surprise components of
policy-rate actions (full sample)
Using the 1-month BA rate to measure expectations,
and using these expectations to decompose policy-rate
changes into expected and surprise components, a test
is performed to determine whether the response of
interest rates to the two components differs and what
differences arise compared with our initial results.
Following the methodology of Cook and Hahn (1989),
the 1-day change in the yields was regressed on the two
components of the policy-rate change,
. (3)
The Canadian results are shown in Table 5a, while
Kuttner’s results for the United States are shown in
Table 5b.13
Isolating the expected and surprise components alters
the results significantly. As would be expected, the
coefficient on the expected portion of the policy-rate
change is statistically insignificant from zero for all
maturities in the Canadian sample, while the surprise
component is significant for all maturities except the
30-year bond. This is consistent with the notion that
12.   For more information on these changes in the United States, see Poole
and Rasche (2003).
13.   Equation (3) introduces a problem concerning an error in the variables,
since the decomposition is inferred rather than measured. An examination of
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market rates react only to new information that comes
available on the date of an event.
Another key result is that, for each maturity, the coefﬁ-
cient of the surprise component is larger than the coef-
ﬁcient on the actual change (see Table 1). This is to be
expected, since the initial regression results are con-
taminated by the inclusion of the expected component,
whose coefficient is not significantly different from
3-month -0.2 3.7 92.1 0.92
(-0.25) (0.96) (24.81)
6-month 0.1 1.7 77.3 0.89
(0.10) (0.57) (18.86)
1-year 0.1 2.7 66.8 0.78
(0.14) (0.69) (12.23)
2-year 0.2 -1.0 59.0 0.70
(0.21) (-0.25) (10.13)
5-year 0.1 -2.2 31.7 0.33
(0.11) (-0.49) (9.53)
10-year -0.6 0.9 14.3 0.16
(-0.66) (0.25) (2.78)
30-year -0.4 1.8 3.4 0.03
(-0.55) (0.58) (0.78)
Table 5a
The One-Day Response of Yields on Canadian
Bonds and Treasury Bills to Expected and Surprise
Components of Policy Actions*
Maturity Intercept Expected Surprise R2
3-month -1.5 12.3 50.4 0.60
(1.2) (2.5) (5.7)
6-month -2.9 2.1 56.3 0.51
(2.2) (0.4) (5.7)
1-year -2.6 -0.3 72.7 0.63
(2.0) (0.1) (7.6)
2-year -2.8 -0.4 61.4 0.52
(2.0) (0.1) (6.0)
5-year -2.4 -5.8 48.1 0.33
(1.6) (0.9) (4.3)
10-year -2.4 -7.4 31.5 0.19
(1.8) (1.3) (3.1)
30-year -2.5 -8.2 19.4 0.13
(2.2) (1.7) (2.3)
Table 5b
The One-Day Response of Yields on U.S. Bonds and
Treasury Bills to Expected and Surprise Components
of Changes in the Target for the Federal Funds Rate*
Maturity Intercept Expected Surprise R2
* Bracketed terms are t-statistics.
* Bracketed terms are t-statistics.
Source: Kuttner (2000)
zero. As well, the responses are larger than the results
obtained by Kuttner for the United States.14
The difference between the response estimated by
Kuttner and our results is evident. At the shortest
maturity, the results suggest that a surprise increase of
100 basis points (bps) in the overnight rate is associ-
ated with an increase of 92 bps in the yield on the
3-month treasury bill, while the same change in the
federal funds target rate would lead to an increase of
only 50 bps in the yield on the U.S. 3-month Treasury
bill. As well, 92 per cent of the variation in the 3-month
bill that is observed on days when the policy rate
moves are explained by the expected and surprise com-
ponents of the policy-rate change. This is considerably
larger than the U.S. results.
The results support the notion that
the Bank’s policy goals are well
understood by market participants,
since policy-rate surprises do not
have much impact on the yields of
longer maturities.
The results suggest that Canadian long yields are less
sensitive to surprises than U.S. long yields. This ﬁnd-
ing supports the notion that the Bank’s policy goals are
well understood by market participants, since pol-
icy-rate surprises do not have much impact on the
yields of longer maturities.
Expected and surprise components of
policy-rate actions (split sample)
The impact of the FADs is again examined by splitting
the sample into pre- and post-FAD periods. Tables 6
and 7 display the results. The magnitudes of the coef-
ﬁcients are not noticeably different from the full sam-
ple results, and the pattern of responses is similar to
what was seen when the initial regression was divided
14. Before making a comparison between the Canadian and U.S. studies, the
caveat must be noted that each study uses a different measure of expectations.
However, the patterns are still similar to what was observed in the previous
section. At the short end, greater magnitude of response is seen in the Cana-
dian data, but this declines sharply as the maturity of the market instrument
increases. As before, we see an anomaly in the U.S. data, in that the surprise
component initially increases as the maturity increases, up to one year.18 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2005
into two samples. The coefficients on the pre-FAD
surprise components are signiﬁcant at all maturities
except the 30-year bond, while the coefﬁcients on the
post-FAD surprise components lose signiﬁcance after
the 5-year bond. Conclusions similar to those noted
for the full sample are derived on this divided sample.15
In the pre-FAD sample, the fact that the surprise com-
ponent remains signiﬁcant as maturities increase may
suggest that, in this period, the reaction of market par-
ticipants to policy-rate changes reflected an under-
standing of both the policy-timing decisions and the
policy goals of the Bank. In the post-FAD sample, the
results suggest that market participants are reacting
only to the timing aspect of a policy action, such that
surprises may be more a question of timing than of
direction. Again, it is worth noting that, in the post-FAD
period, the majority of policy actions were decreases
in policy rates, and the period can be considered one
of policy easing. Thus, the direction may have been
more apparent to market participants even without
the introduction of the FADs.
Conclusion
The purpose of this article was threefold: to estimate
the impact of raw policy-rate actions on ﬁxed-income
markets; to estimate the impact of surprise policy-rate
actions on fixed-income markets; and to assess whether
the introduction of the FADs has affected these results,
including markets’ perceptions. The main ﬁnding is
that unexpected policy actions by the Bank of Canada
have a signiﬁcant effect on market rates at the shorter
end of the yield curve, with the effect dissipating as
the maturity increases. This finding implies that policy
actions signal only the timing of interest rate changes
necessary to achieve the Bank’s inﬂation target and do
not signal its longer-term policy goals. A second ﬁnd-
ing is that the impact on longer-term interest rates of a
surprise action by the Bank has diminished since the
introduction of the FADs. This suggests that the Bank’s
long-term policy goals are well understood and credi-
ble, since the lack of movement in the long end indi-
cates that market participants do not view surprises as
inconsistent with the Bank’s inﬂation target.
15.   As with the full sample, a Chow test for a structural break between the
two periods is rejected at the 5 per cent  level for all maturities.
3-month -1.0 -0.8 94.8 0.92
(-0.69) (-0.12) (14.12)
6-month -0.3 -4.9 78.0 0.93
(-0.28) (-0.95) (14.56)
1-year 0.1 -0.5 63.7 0.88
(0.10) (-0.10) (11.02)
2-year 0.2 -6.1 59.6 0.85
(0.17) (-1.03) (9.71)
5-year -1.4 -2.7 35.8 0.67
(-1.05) (-0.46) (5.88)
10-year -2.2 0.2 20.3 0.37
(-1.54) (0.03) (3.08)
30-year -2.2 3.5 8.2 0.13
(-1.60) (0.57) (1.30)
Table 6
The One-Day Response of Yields on Canadian
Bonds and Treasury Bills to Expected and Surprise
Components of Changes in the Overnight Rate
(pre-FAD sample, 21 observations)*
Maturity Intercept Expected Surprise R2
* Bracketed terms are t-statistics.
3-month 0.6 7.4 91.6 0.90
(0.94) (2.81) (14.88)
6-month 1.0 6.9 85.3 0.82
(1.15) (2.03) (10.62)
1-year 0.9 6.0 84.5 0.64
(0.69) (1.09) (6.51)
2-year 0.6 2.5 62.8 0.43
(0.43) (0.42) (14.68)
5-year 1.0 -1.1 24.6 0.07
(0.76) (-0.16) (4.34)
10-year 0.2 1.9 0.2 0.01
(0.17) (0.43) (0.02)
30-year 0.5 1.5 -7.3 0.05
(0.62) (0.51) (-1.03)
Table 7
The One-Day Response of Yields on
Canadian Bonds and Treasury Bills to Expected
and Surprise Components of Policy Actions
(post-FAD sample, 28 observations)*
Maturity Intercept Expected Surprise R2
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